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I. Introduction

2006 Water Law Symposium:
Keynote Address
By Roderick E. Walston*

I really appreciate the opportunity to
speak at this wonderful conference. I think
this conference will be very successful in
the future as a result of the timeliness of
the issue of water law. You are all beginning to learn by your attendance at this
conference what it took me an entire
career to learn: Water law is truly a very
exciting and challenging field of law to
practice.
Water law is especially important in
California and the West because our natural water supply is insufficient for our
population. As a result of the scarcity of
water, water law is linked with public policy considerations in a way that other
areas of law are not. How and where we
distribute our water determines in large
part which areas and industries will grow
and which will not. It also determines the
balance between our environmental quality and our domestic and agricultural
growth. Former California Governor Pat
Brown, who was responsible for developing much of California's water infrastructure, once told me that water issues were
by far the most interesting problems he
ever encountered. He also said that water
issues are most important because they
* J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Columbia
University; Of Counsel, Best Best & Krieger LLP.
Mr. Walston has extensive experience in the areas
of natural resources and environmental law, having served both as a litigator for state regulatory
industries and as a manager of litigation for federal and state agencies in these areas. He has particular expertise in water rights and water quality
laws. Prior to joining Best Best & Krieger LLP, he
held a number of positions including Acting
Solicitor and Deputy Solicitor for the U.S.
Department of the Interior.
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are going to have the biggest effect on
California's future.
In California today, we see the importance of water law issues everywhere
around us. We are "submerged" in water
issues. How much water should flow from
northern California to southern California?
How should we balance environmental
preservation against economic growth?
How should we plan for future water supplies for the growing population of
California? These questions are at the centerpiece of water law today and will remain
the centerpiece for generations to come.
During my career, I have been fortunate enough to see water law from many
different perspectives. I have spent most
of my career in government service, and
now I am in the private sector. While in
government, I spent most of my career in
the California Attorney General's office,
and then eventually with the U.S.
Department of the Interior in Washington,
D.C. I have worked on both sides of the
federal/state fence and the public/private
fence. In fact, I have been on both sides of
many fences. This gives me a unique perspective. Actually, I found that I was able
to take many of the briefs that I wrote
when I was in the Attorney General's office
and simply use them when I moved on to
do work with the federal government. I
just had to insert the word "not" in a lot of
sections.
In many ways, water law reminds me
of an egg because what it means depends
on the eye of the beholder. When a mother hen looks at an egg, she sees a chick,
whereas a rooster sees his virility, and a
1. The Aqueduct opened on November 5, 1913.
William Mulholland, Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power Biography, http://www.ladwp.com
/ladwp/cms/ladwp001562.jsp.
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farmer sees his breakfast. In the same way,
water law means different things to different people.
To environmentalists, water law is
the way to preserve our natural
resources—to preserve fish in the Delta,
salmon in the ocean, and maybe even a
way to drain Hetch Hetchy. To cities, farmers, and developers, water law is a way to
develop and grow our economy and
industry, to build the "shining city on the
hill," to produce foods that will be marketed in California and throughout the world,
and to sustain growing populations.
Bill Mulholland, who was the architect of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, which
brings water from Owens Valley to Los
Angeles, summarized this point at the
Aqueduct's opening ceremonies.1 When
the first water poured out of the Aqueduct,
he said to the people of Los Angeles:
"There it is. Take it."2 That was his view;
the water was there for the taking.
These different perspectives all have
some validity (perhaps some more than
others) because water serves many purposes in our society. My own perspective
of water law has been shaped by my long
career in government service. Based on
my government career, I am more inclined
to see water law through the prism of federalism, as a way to determine the balance between federal and state power and
how they regulate water, a way to define
the role of the federal government and the
states in our constitutional system. From
this perspective, the issue is not so much
who wins (as between environmentalists
and water users) but rather who decides.
2. Id.
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During my presentation today, I will
discuss issues of federalism in the field of
water law, particularly in terms of how
they arise before the United States
Supreme Court and are decided by the
Court. This is a very timely topic because
the nature of our federalism is being
much debated across the land today. The
Supreme Court itself is engaged in this
debate. The Court has issued recent decisions that have defined the relationship
between the federal government and the
states in our constitutional system, and
these decisions have enormous ramifications for water law. To be sure, the Court's
jurisprudence in this area has been
unsteady and uneven. Some people say
that the Court is in the midst of a federalism revolution that is going to continue;
others say that the revolution is over, and
still others say it never occurred.
The Court has a case on its docket
right now that raises federalism issues in
water law, and its decision may clarify the
federal and state roles in regulating water.3
Additionally, there are other cases lurking
out there that may work their way to the
Supreme Court. This is an exciting time to
be practicing in the field of water law.
I. Background: Federalism in Water Law
To understand federalism in water
law, you need to have basic understanding
3. Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (argued, Feb. 21,
2006).

of how our water laws came about. Indeed,
our water laws are the product of our own
history, much more so than in many other
areas of law. In the beginning, the states
controlled all navigable and non-navigable waters. After the American Revolution,
the King of England's sovereign powers
went to the states, and the states had all
the power. When new states, like
California, came into the Union, they were
on equal footing with other states, receiving sovereign control of their waters.
The Constitution delegates a substantial amount of power to the federal
government. One of the powers is the
power to regulate interstate commerce. It
is this power that provides basis for laws
like the Endangered Species Act,4 the
Clean Water Act,5 and other acts that regulate our environment at the national
level. But the states have otherwise
retained control of the right to regulate
the actual use of the water within their
boarders. For their part, the states have
adopted two kinds of water rights laws—
riparian laws and appropriation laws.
Most eastern states recognize riparian rights. The riparian right is an incident
of land ownership—the right belongs to
the land. If you own Blackacre, you have
the right to use water that flows across
your land. The right attaches to the land.
In the West, the experience was different and a different system developed.
The early miners developed a custom of
diverting water from land they did not
own to mining claims. The federal government owned the lands across which the
water was running, and the miners felt
free to divert the water. This simple cus4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
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While I am not agnostic on how water is
used, I respect the institutions that have
been created to make these decisions. As
a government lawyer, my job was to make
sure that the right institution made the
decisions, that it followed the right
process, and that it applied the right laws.
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tom, which developed in the gold mining
camps in eastern California, ripened into
the doctrine of appropriation. This is the
prevalent water law of the West today.
Under this doctrine, the right to use water
depends on the right to put it to beneficial
use. The priority of the right depends on
the simple principle of "first in time, first
in right." Remember this as the same principle that controlled the line for the high
school drinking fountain.
Today, the appropriation doctrine is
the basic water law that allows water to be
transported from rivers in eastern
California to coastal cities like Los Angeles
and San Diego. This is an example of how
water law follows public policy: Where
water is plentiful (as in the East), water
rights attach to the land; where water is
scarce (as in California), rights depend on
how the water is used. As a result, America
has a water law system unlike any other in
the world. It is the product of our unique
history. The federal government has the
right to regulate interstate commerce,
which allows it to regulate water for some
purposes (e.g., protecting endangered
species), but the states regulate the right
to use water itself.
These different federal and state systems sometimes come into conflict. One
major conflict arose in California several
years ago over whether state water laws
applied to federal reclamation products.

6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372-586 (2006).
7. See generally California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645 (1978) (discussing the endeavors of the
Central Valley Project).
8. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2006).
9. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 647.
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In 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation
Act,6 which authorizes the federal government to build federal water projects all
over the West. These projects, like the
Central Valley Project in California,7 have
developed much of the West's water supply. The Reclamation Act contains a provision which requires the federal government to comply with state water laws.8
Under this provision, California's State
Water Resources Control Board imposed
some rather Draconian conditions on the
New Melones Dam, a federal project.9
These conditions, among other things,
require that water be released from this
project to protect downstream water quality.10 The federal government was very
unhappy with the conditions, so they
challenged them in court, claiming that
states do not have the right to control
abuse of water over reclamation dams.11
Indeed, the Supreme Court issued several
decisions during the 1950s upholding the
argument that states cannot control federal water uses.12
In 1978, the Court returned to those
prior decisions and, while not explicitly
reversing them, moved in the opposite
direction. In California v. United States, the
Court held that the federal government
has to acquire its water rights under state
law.13 Moreover, the Court held that the
federal government must comply with
conditions that the states attach to water
rights.14 In retrospect, the Court's deci-

12. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken,
357 U.S. 275 (1958) (reversing a state court decision that refused to recognize contracts entered
into pursuant to the Reclamation Act); United States
v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (finding
that congressional control of water use superceded state authority).

10. Id.

13. California v. United States, 783 U.S. at 678-79.

11. Id.

14. Id.
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II. Environmental Statutes and Federalism
In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
Congress enacted several laws that provided for environmental protection at the
national level. These laws include the
Clean Water Act,16 the Clean Air Act,17 the
National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),18 the Endangered Species Act,19
the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980,20 Superfund,21 and many others. These laws are responsible for flooding our legal lexicon with acronyms. For
example, a recent Ninth Circuit opinion
included the sentence "The CEQA
requires an EIR rather than an EIS, which
is required under NEPA."22 This moved
the court to comment that "acronyms are
15. Id. at 653.
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).

not required by any federal statute but
seem to be the preferred lexicon of environmental law."23 So if environmental law
is a field you intend to enter, you need to
know your acronyms. In any event, some
of these environmental laws raise very
important federalism issues. This is especially true of the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act. I would like to
discuss some of the issues arising under
these two acts in just a little more detail.
A. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes permit programs that regulate the discharge of pollutants into navigable
waters.24 One permit program regulates
pollutant discharges from point sources
and another authorizes the Army Corps of
Engineers to exercise permit authority
over all discharges from dredge and fill
operations in navigable waters.25
Congress did limit the intrusion of this
federal act into the states' traditional
areas of responsibility. Most importantly,
the CWA does allow the states to take over
their own National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) programs.26
California was the first state to do this. In
fact, to date almost every state has taken
over its own NPDES program.
Congress also limited their intrusion
upon state sovereignty by providing that
the permit programs apply only to navigable waters.27 Why did Congress do that?
22. Laub v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 342 F.3d
1080, 1083 (2003).

17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006).

23. Id.

18. Id. §§ 4321-4370 (2006).

24. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).

19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).

25. Id. § 1252 (2006).

20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).

26. Id. § 1252(c).

21. The Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).

27. Id. § 1252(c)(3).
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sion in 1978 was one of the earliest articulations of the fundamental reshaping of
the balance of power between the federal
government and the states to regulate
water in the West. Under this restructuring
of the law, the Court began to pay more
deference to state water laws than it had
in the past. Then-Justice Rehnquist noted
that the "consistent thread of purposeful
and continued deference to water law by
Congress" is one of the hallmarks of
Congress' reclamation policy.15 This does
not mean that the states always win, in
fact, they often do not. However, it does
mean that state interests are considered
and given more weight than they were
prior to that decision.
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The answer is that the Constitution gave
Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce, and with that power came the
power to regulate navigable waters. This
leaves to the states the power to regulate
everything else, which is to say, non-navigable waters. However, Congress muddied
these waters by defining the term "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States."28 The term "navigable waters" is
very limited and discreet, whereas the
term "waters of the United States" could
potentially include every body of water in
the United States. This is one example of
a situation where Congress provided a
definition that is less clear than the term
it defines.
The major question is whether the
broad, amorphous term "waters of the
United States" includes wetlands.
Wetlands are swamps, bogs, and marshes
around the nation that support various
types of water fowl and migratory birds.
The question is whether the federal government has the power to regulate these
wetlands under the CWA. It raises an even
broader question: Whether the federal
government has the right to regulate nonnavigable waters under the CWA.
Remember, non-navigable waters have
been traditionally regulated by the states.
The Supreme Court has issued two decisions that touch on this question and partially resolve the issue. In a 1985 case,
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
the Court held that the federal government

28. Id. § 1362(7) (2006).
29. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
30. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County
(SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
31. 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 414 (argued, Feb. 21, 2006).
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can regulate wetlands that are adjacent to
navigable waters.29 The Court went the
other way about five years ago in the Solid
Waste Agency case, holding that the federal
government cannot regulate isolated
waters.30 Isolated waters are wholly separated from navigable waters, having no
connection to them at all. What about the
vast bulk of wetlands that fall between
these extremes? These wetlands are isolated in that they are not adjacent to navigable waters; however, they are connected
to navigable waters remotely, and therefore not completely isolated.
That is the question in a pair of consolidated cases currently pending before
the Court: Rapanos v. United States31 and
Carabell v. United States.32 In Rapanos, the
Army Corps of Engineers undertook to
regulate wetlands that are connected very
remotely to navigable waters.33 The wetlands were located about twenty miles
from a navigable lake.34 In Carabell, the
Army Corps of Engineers undertook to
regulate wetlands that were separated
from navigable waters by a spoil berm and
thus not connected to navigable waters at
all.35 No water from the wetlands in the
Carabell case ever reached the nearest
body of "navigable waters," which was a
lake about one mile away.36 In both
cases, the wetlands have no apparent
effects on the navigable waters or on
interstate commerce, which is, of course,
the lynchpin in Congress' power to regulate. The Court's decisions in these two

32. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d
704 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 415
(argued, Feb. 21, 2006).
33. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 632-33.
34. Id. at 642.
35. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 705.
36. Id. at 705-06.
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The Rapanos and Carabell cases were
argued before the Court on February 21,
2006. These cases were the first environmental and water cases heard by the
Court since Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito took their positions on the
Court. Not only will these cases provide
insight on how the Court views these
broad issues of federalism, but they will
also help us learn how the two new members of the Court view these issues.
B. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)
appears to be having a larger impact on
state water laws and private rights than
any other piece of federal legislation.
Unlike the CWA, the ESA makes no
accommodations for state sovereignty.
Congress' goal was to protect endangered
species regardless of the effect on state
and local laws. In Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill, the Supreme Court held that
Congress' goal was to protect endangered
species "whatever the cost."37 The ESA
requires federal agencies to consult with
federal service agencies before they take
any action that may impair endangered
species.38 After the consultation, the federal service agency then makes recommendations with the intent of avoiding
jeopardy to the species. The federal
agency must comply with these recommendations or risk criminal sanctions.40
37. 437 U.S. 153, 183 (1978).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).
39. Id.
40. Id.

The ESA also prohibits any individual, any
state, or even the federal government
itself, from killing, endangering, impairing, or injuring, an endangered species
without a special permit issued by the
Secretary of the Interior.41
The ESA has a major impact on state
water laws and private rights because the
ESA often requires that federal action
agencies re-allocate water in order to protect endangered fish, even though state
laws may have already allocated that
same water for private use. This is where
the conflict arises. The ESA also has major
impact on local land use regulation
because it prevents local governments
from approving local residential or commercial development in areas where
endangered species live. I am not going to
address whether these effects are good or
bad, or what should be done about them;
I simply note that they do exist.
The ESA has a major impact in
California because most of the endangered
species listed by Secretary of the Interior
are found in two states—Hawaii and
California.42 The ESA is probably one of
nation's most popular environmental laws
passed by Congress, and, as a result, it will
likely prove one of the most difficult for
Congress to amend. It is also one of the
most controversial laws passed by
Congress because of the major impact it
has on private land use and states rights.
Today Congress is considering amending
the ESA to resolve some of these concerns.
The ESA does raise one interesting
legal question that cannot be summarized
41. Id. § 1533 (2006). These permits are very
difficult to obtain.
42. The Endangered Species Listing Program,
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/listing/index.html
#species.
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cases will tell us a great deal about how
far the federal government can go in regulating non-navigable waters (like wetlands) that have been traditionally regulated by the states.
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more simply than this: Is the ESA constitutional? To be sure, the Court would never
invalidate the whole ESA under any circumstances. However, the question of whether
the ESA is constitutional as applied to a
specific species is another matter. The ESA
was enacted pursuant to Congress' commerce powers, but was not enacted for the
purpose of regulating commerce. It was
enacted to regulate and protect species.
The constitutional issue is whether
Congress' regulation of endangered species
can be squared with Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce.
To date, four federal circuit courts of
appeal have considered whether the ESA
is constitutional in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions. All four decisions ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the ESA as applied to the species in
those cases. These four decisions involve:
(1) an endangered fly in southern
California called the "Delhi Sands FlowerLoving Fly;"43 (2) endangered red wolves
that the Secretary of the Interior reintroduced in North Carolina and Tennessee;44
(3) endangered cave bugs and spiders in
Texas;45 and (4) the endangered Arroyo
Toad in southern California (San Diego
County).46
Although these four decisions upheld
the constitutionality of ESA, the reasoning of the decisions varied greatly. Every
one of these decisions had vigorous dissenting opinions—some written by
judges who are on the short list for the
next appointment to the Supreme Court.
43. NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
44. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
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Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts (while sitting on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals)
wrote one of the dissenting opinions.
Justice Roberts noted that it was difficult
to see how a "hapless toad that, for reasons of its own, lives entirely in southern
California" can be said to affect interstate
commerce.47
The Court has followed a very uneven
path in deciding these constitutional
issues. Since the 1930s, the Court has
broadly construed Congress' commerce
powers. In fact, the Court never struck
down a congressional enactment on the
grounds that it went too far. The Court
always deferred to Congress' judgment
that it was regulating interstate commerce. In two recent cases, however, the
Court went the other way and held that
Congress' constitutional powers to regulate commerce are limited and courts do
not have to automatically defer to
Congress. The Court found that there had
to be a separate determination as to
whether the regulated activity actually has
an effect on interstate commerce. The two
seminal cases that established this rule
are United States v. Lopez48 (which involved
regulation of guns near schools), and
United States v. Morrison49 (which involved
the Violence Against Women Act). In both
cases, the Court determined that
Congress went too far.50
More recently, however, the Court
went the opposite direction in a marijuana case that came out of California.51 In
Raich, the Court held that Congress can
47. Id. at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).

45. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622
(5th Cir. 2003).

48. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

46. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062
(D.C. Cir. 2003).

50. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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49. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
51. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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Let me give you an idea of how courts
are looking at this constitutional issue in
different ways. Essentially, courts have
come up with three different models for
determining whether endangered species
affect interstate commerce:
(1) Whether the endangered species,
by itself, significantly affects interstate commerce. Under this model, a purely local
species may have no effect on interstate
commerce, and therefore may not be subject to federal regulation under the ESA.
(2) Whether the endangered
species—in combination with all other
endangered species found anywhere—
significantly affects interstate commerce.
Under this approach, all species (endangered or not) are part of nature's biodiversity, and if you remove one part, you
threaten the entire system. Biodiversity
does affect interstate commerce. This
approach allows courts to find that even
purely local species may affect interstate
commerce.
(3) Whether the actor—the person
whose activities threaten the endangered
species—is engaged in interstate commerce. Here, the focus is on the actor

52. 125 S. Ct. at 2211.

(who is the subject of regulation), rather
than the species (which is the object of
regulation). Under this approach, a regulation will almost always be valid,
because the actor is usually a developer
and development always has an effect on
interstate commerce. However, not all
actors are engaged in commercial activity.
For example, a lone hiker in the woods or
a homeowner landscaping his property
may chance upon the last member of an
endangered species. The actor is presumably not engaged in any commercial activity and, as a result, would have the right to
destroy the last member of the species
with impunity.
This is a difficult constitutional issue.
On one hand, there are important reasons
for protecting endangered species. On the
other, Congress' protection of such
species cannot be easily reconciled with
its power to regulate interstate commerce. As a result, these cases raise questions concerning extent of Congress'
power to regulate water, and to regulate
the environment generally. To date, the
Court has not reviewed any case involving
the constitutionality of the ESA, but the
Court will likely have to address this issue
in the future.
III. Inter-Basin Transfers
Another major federalism issue is
whether federal permit programs of CWA
apply to western water projects. Generally,
permit programs apply to anyone who
"adds" pollutants to "waters of United
States."53 The question then arises: When
a water project transfers water between
different water basins, and that transfer
includes pollutants that reach the second
basin, has the project "added" pollutants

53. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
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regulate local marijuana use and deferred
to Congress' judgment that regulation of
local marijuana use is related to interstate
commerce.52 There is no question that
the Court will have to resolve this constitutional issue in the context of whether
the ESA is constitutional as applied to an
individual species. This is a looming question that the Court will probably take up in
the near future, especially considering that
at least one of the members of the Court is
now on record raising the issue.
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to "waters of the United States"? This
issue is of paramount importance in the
West. Western water projects, such as the
Central Valley Project in California,54 typically transfer water between basins in providing water supplies. Often the transfers
contain some pollutants that are added to
the second basin. These projects generally acquire water rights—including right to
transfer water between basins—under
state law. However, if the CWA applies to
inter-basin transfers, projects may have to
get permits under the CWA, and the conditions attached to the permits may
trump conditions imposed under state
water rights laws.
Superficially, it would seem that projects must get CWA permits in order to
transfer water containing pollutants to
other basins. When water is transferred,
the pollutants are introduced into the second basin—and thus "added" to that
basin. The CWA contains another provision, section 101(g), which limits the
Act's intrusion into state water laws.
Section 101(g)55 provides that the Act
shall not supersede a state's authority to
"allocate" quantities of water within its
Thus, section 101(g)
jurisdiction.56
appears to create an exemption from permit requirements for western water projects, because they "allocate" water.
The Supreme Court considered this
issue two years ago, in a case arising out
of the Florida Everglades.57 This case was
not a good vehicle to decide the meaning
of section 101(g) because the Florida project transferred water for conservation and
54. See Central Valley Project Improvement Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2006).
56. Id.
57. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukkee Tribe of
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
134
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flood control purposes, not for the purpose of allocating water among different
users (as is the case in most western projects). Nevertheless, the Court was fully
aware of importance of the section 101(g)
issue. During oral argument, Justice
Breyer speculated aloud (without asking a
question) that if the Court rules one way,
it may allow degradation of "pristine" bodies of water; but if it rules the other way, it
may interfere with Congress' policy of
exempting western water projects.58 The
Court did not decide the issue, and
instead remanded the case to the district
court, indicating that further development
of the record was necessary.59 A Second
Circuit case involving the same issues is
also poised for Supreme Court review.60
Therefore, this issue may come before the
Court in the near future, giving the Court
another opportunity to decide whether it
is pursuing a federalism revolution.
IV. Takings
I would like to briefly mention another area of law that does not strictly involve
issues of federalism, but does apply to all
government regulation of water and the
environment. The central question is
whether the government has the right to
reduce water rights for public purposes
(e.g., protecting endangered species or
protecting public trust uses) without paying compensation to the water user whose
right is reduced. This involves potential
conflicts, not between governments, but
between government and individuals.
Under the Takings Clause of the
58. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626).
59. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. at 112.
60. Catskill Mts. Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v.
City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001).
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The first question that arises in water
regulatory takings cases is whether the
public or the private water user owns the
water. If the public owns the water, the
public has the property right, and the public can do whatever it wants with its property right. If that is the case, the private
user does not have a constitutionally protected property interest. If the private user
owns the water, then he does have the
property right, and it follows that he has
the same rights as any other property

61. "Nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation." U.S.
Const. amend. V.
62. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S.
528 (2005); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New

owner and is justified in asserting a takings claim. This question arose many
years ago in a case I handled before the
California Supreme Court, which involved
the question of whether the public trust
doctrine applies to water rights.65 The
case arose out of the State's attempt to
reduce the City of Los Angeles' right to
divert water from Mono Lake Basin and to
send it down to southern California.66
The California Supreme Court upheld
the state's position. The court held that
the public trust doctrine does apply to
water rights, and therefore the State can
reduce the amount of water that Los
Angeles is taking out of the Mono Lake
Basin. Los Angeles filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court arguing that its water
rights had been unconstitutionally taken
and it was entitled to compensation. The
Court denied the petition, likely not on
the merits, but because the California
Supreme Court had remanded the matter
to a lower court and therefore there was
no final state court decision. This is still
very much a live issue in California.
This issue has also recently arisen in
two cases before the Court of Federal
Claims in Washington, D.C. In these
cases, federal or state water projects have
reduced water deliveries to their customers in order to provide more water for
endangered species. The customers then
argued that their water was unconstitutionally taken and that they were entitled
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
63. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
64. Id. at 2655-56.
65. Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors
of Mono County, 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972).
66. Id. at 1051-52.
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Constitution, the government must pay
compensation to property owners when it
"takes" their property for public use.61 In
recent years, the Supreme Court has held
that in some instances the government
must pay property owners when it regulates
a property right.62 This is called the "regulatory takings doctrine." This issue is distinct from the one recently receiving
media attention, which involves governmental power to take private property for
economic development. That was the
issue decided in Kelo v. City of New London.
There, the issues were whether economic
development is a public use and whether
government can take the property if it provides compensation.64 The question that
arises in regulatory takings cases, and
especially in the water context, is not
whether there is a public use (such takings are almost invariably for public benefit, e.g., protecting endangered species),
but whether the property can be taken
without payment of compensation.
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to compensation. Each case was heard by
a different judge and the judges came to
exactly opposite conclusions.
One case arose out of California and
involved farmers in the Central Valley who
had contracted for water from the State
Water Project.67 The other case arose out
of Oregon and involved farmers in
Klamath who have contract rights to water
from the federal project in the Klamath
River Basin in Oregon.68
The factual outlines of the cases were
essentially the same. In both cases, the
customers were farmers and had contracts
that allowed them to obtain water under
the terms of the contract. In both cases,
the federal service agencies issued biological opinions under the ESA that required
the projects to reduce the amount of
water deliveries to the customers in order
to provide more water for endangered
fish. The biological opinions required the
reallocation of water from the farmers to
the endangered fish.
In the California case, Judge John Paul
Wiese held that the federal government
does have the right to reallocate the water,
but that it has to pay compensation to the
farmers for the loss of their rights. In his
view, the farmers had a contract, which
created a property right. Therefore, when
the federal government requires that right
to be reduced for some public purpose (in
this case, protecting endangered species),
the farmers have lost something of value.
As a result, they have lost a property right
and are entitled to just compensation
under the Takings Clause.69

67. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United
States, 59 Fed Cl. 246 (2003).
68. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67
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In the Oregon case, Judge Francis
Allegra also held that the federal government has the right to reallocate the water.
However, he held that the government does
not have to pay compensation to the farmers for the loss of their rights. In his view,
the contracts created no property rights. A
contract is no more than a contract; it gives
rights and expectations but does not create
property. Therefore, a contract does not
automatically create a property right or the
ability to assert a takings claim.70
These two judges fundamentally disagree on the question of whether the government has to pay compensation to people like the farmers, who have contracts
for the delivery of water that are interfered
with in order to provide more water for
endangered fish. This question is critically important in water law today because it
may determine whether government can
effectively regulate water. If the government has to pay a water user every time it
regulates and/or reduces rights, then the
government is will be very cautious before
promulgating any regulation. Protecting
endangered species is an admirable
cause, but governments may think differently if their budgets are exposed to
multi-million dollar takings claims. On
the other hand, water users argue that, as
a matter of simple fairness, the burdens of
these regulations should be placed on the
entire public because the public benefits
from the protection of endangered fish.
This a very fundamental question. I
do not know what the outcome will be,
but I predict that the Supreme Court will
be compelled to address this water law
issue in the years ahead.
Fed. Cl. 504 (2005).
69. Tulare, 59 Fed. Cl. at 246.
70. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 515.
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What does all this mean? First, I think
that we are on verge of some major developments in water law, both in terms of the
balance between federal and state power
to regulate water and whether government has to pay for regulating water.
These issues are very important and affect
the entire nation. Therefore, I think the
Supreme Court will have to address them.
Of course, the Court is already planning to
address one of these questions in the wetlands case that I mentioned.71
Second, the longer I work in water law
the more I become aware of how water
laws change as our public needs change.
Therefore, I warn those of you who are
about to enter this area of law, that it is not
one in which the rules are fixed for all eternity. These rules are dynamic and flexible
and change as our water needs change.
When I started in this field many years ago,
I naïvely thought that there was a discrete
set of issues that I could put in a box and
that, once I got the answers to these questions, the rules would be set for future generations. Then all I would have to do is take
these well-settled principles and apply
them to the facts of individual cases. Now,
I see that it is not that way at all and that
the rules and laws will continue to change
as our needs continue to change in the
future. I pass on to the students in attendance this very hard-earned lesson that
has taken me a career to learn: No matter
how hard you try, you will not be able to
solve all legal problems in your lifetime.
Third, to all the students in the audience, I do have an ulterior purpose in providing the perspective of a former govern-

ment lawyer. It is to encourage you to at
least think about pursuing a career in government and public law. If you do, I can
promise you that you will not find yourself
in the distant future wallowing in riches and
thinking about which vacation home you
are going to visit next summer, but you will
have the satisfaction of knowing that you
represent the people, in the broadest
sense, on matters of great importance to
you. Government is the one institution in
our society that is charged with the function
of representing everybody. Government is
often criticized about how it performs that
function-perhaps justly so, but nonetheless
that is its function. I do not for a moment
discount the importance of lawyers who
represent more specific interests, whether
environmental, property, or otherwise. The
legal profession is certainly a big tent that
can accommodate many different points of
view. A government career does, however,
give you a perspective about public law that
may be different from that of other lawyers.
As a result you may have the opportunity to
share that unique perspective with your
peers, perhaps at future conferences, as I
have done today.
Thank you very much.
Questions from the Audience
Audience Member: What is your
sense of the future intersection of groundwater law and the lack of regulation in
California?
Walston: Groundwater regulation lies
in California's future, at least at some
point. A lot of states, Arizona for example,
which is also an extremely arid state, have
extensive groundwater programs. Our

71. Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (argued, Feb.
21, 2006).
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population continues to grow in California
and our water supplies remain somewhat
finite. If we do effect more storage projects
to restore more water, then I think the regulation of groundwater is almost unavoidable. When that will happen, I do not
know. It seems to me that it will have to
happen sometime in the future because of
the importance of the issue.
Peter Douglas: I have been in public
service for thirty-five years, and this is the
first time that I have had the opportunity
to thank you for the work that you have
done. My name is Peter Douglas and I am
the Executive Director of the Coastal
Commission. We have worked together
over the years and we have changed, but I
still recognize you. I want to publicly thank
you for your dedication to public service
and the excellent representation you have
provided all of us by protecting the public's interest throughout your career. You
have made a heck of a difference. You are
a very humble, modest person, but your
morality, your ethics, and your dedication
to public ethics is something that I am
honored to publicly recognize.
Walston: For those who don't know,
that is Peter Douglas, and his position is
Executive Director of the California Costal
Commission. He has held that position for
many years. If memory serves, I think that
Peter is the third person to serve in that
capacity. This does bring back some wonderful memories that have nothing to do with
water law, but do have to do with coastal regulation. I had the privilege of being appointed by the Attorney General to represent the
Coastal Commission during its formative
years. A gentleman who has long since
retired, named Carl Bronchi, who is one of
the greatest members I have ever served
under, and is a great public servant, served
with me in that capacity. We basically molded the law for California in the formative
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years of the Coastal Commission. It was really a very exciting time, and Peter was there,
as they say, "present at the Creation," and a
great participant in that as well.
Audience Member: You discussed a
very interesting area of the law, the intersection of state-based water allocation,
the Endangered Species Act and the Fifth
Amendment. Do you have any opinion on
the appropriateness of the narrow Court
of Claims being the first part of the judiciary to tackle those issues?
Walston: I am not quite sure that I
understand the question. What I think you
might be suggesting is that the Court of
Claims has a very limited function and
jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction over claims
for damages against the United States.
Theoretically, if you want to go into court
and enjoin the Endangered Species Act or
the Clean Water Act or anything else as it
applies to you, the claim would have to be
brought in a federal district court. If you
have no problem with the regulation itself
and wants to allow the federal government
to regulate but simply wants to be compensated for damages created by the regulation then you go to the Court of Federal
Claims. It is very interesting that some
property rights advocates have been making a choice in recent years about which
way they want to go. In other words, do they
want to go to the federal district courts, perhaps a federal district court in California,
which would then be appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, which is very hostile to property
owner claims? Alternatively, the plaintiff
may want to bring the action in the Court of
Federal Claims in the form of a claim for
damages. The decisions of the Court of
Claims are appealed to the Federal Circuit
in Washington, D.C., allowing the parties to
bypass the Ninth Circuit. It is simply a
choice, if you are a property owner and you
want to develop your property, and the gov-
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This is the calculation that the individual property owner has to make: (1)
whether he wants the use of his property
or he wants damages; and (2) will he be
better off by going through the appellate
process back in Washington, D.C. than he
would in the Ninth Circuit? That is a calculated decision that property advocates
are making. I should hasten to add that I
have had some conversations with some
well known attorneys practicing in this
field of law, and they have told me that
this is a choice between the devil and the
deep blue sea. The Ninth Circuit is
adverse to their claims in most cases, but
the Federal Circuit is also somewhat hostile to their claims. Attorneys are having
slightly better luck with the Court of
Federal Claims, as witnessed by the decision I mentioned by Judge Wiese.72 These
are all calculations that you have to take
into account when you represent clients.
Your clients may come to you and say, "I
heard Mr. Walston speak at this conference, and he told me I have two choices.
Tell me, which one will win?" That is a
risky determination given that you might
lose either way, but that is the calculation
that property attorneys are undertaking.
Audience Member: Is there a possibility that trade agreements like NAFTA or
GAP may limit the ability of the state to
regulate water?
Walston: Absolutely, but in ways that
we cannot yet anticipate. That is an issue

72. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United
States, 59 Fed Cl. 246 (2003).
73. 16 U.S.C. 703-712 (2006).

that has been lurking for a long time.
Congress has not come up with an answer
yet. I am not sure what the answer is. I know
that the Supreme Court faces these questions every time that the United States
enters into a treaty with a foreign country.
They did that, for example, with the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act. The executive
branch entered into a treaty with Canada to
protect endangered birds that flew between
Canada and the United States and back
again. This created treaty rights. The question was whether the treaty overrides state
laws. That question went to the Supreme
Court, which held that the Treaty did in fact
override state law. I assume that the same
would hold true today.
The treaty power rests up in the ether
with the Congressional power, and both of
these powers override state law. The question which then arises is more a political
question than a legal one. Congress is concerned about the impact on state laws, and
as a result writes language into the treaties
that will protect state laws to some degree.
To the extent that there are conflicts, however, we all know that the Supremacy
Clause will govern. Under the Supremacy
Clause, the treaty power of the federal government overrides state laws without question. Additionally, there is no question that
the Commerce Clause clearly overrides
state laws. The question that is raised in
the cases I mentioned is whether congressional enactments are within the scope of
the Commerce Clause. That is the question
that was before the Supreme Court on
February 21 in the Rapanos matter.

74. Id.
75. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118 (1919).
76. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 414 (argued, Feb. 21, 2006).
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ernment will not let you because you are
building over an endangered species habitat, you must make this choice.
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